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Responsibility to Pay: Compensating Civilian Casualties of War
by Jonathan Tracy*
Mr. JaWad
1 is the patriarch of what was a large, indus-
trious Iraqi family. His family, his parents, and his 
two siblings’ families resided in one complex, located 
in Nassiriyia, Iraq. On March 23, 2003 tragedy struck. After 
U.S. fighter planes targeted an area nearby, and an errant mis-
sile landed on the family complex. The only survivors were Mr. 
Jawad and his teenaged niece Zainab, who was left with severe 
burns covering over forty percent of her body. Thirteen family 
members died. The United States paid Mr. Jawad and Zainab 
$5,000 for their losses and suffering.
On June 17, 2003, several children were playing in a clear-
ing in the Al-Shula neighborhood of Baghdad. A few weeks 
earlier, unexploded cluster bombs from U.S. artillery landed in 
the clearing. Unaware of its deadly impact, the neighborhood 
children unwittingly picked up the ordinance, and it detonated. 
The explosion injured four children and killed Mr. Mahmoud’s 
three-year-old daughter. The United States did not compensate 
Mr. Mahmoud. 
On June 18, 2003, Mr. Mohammed, a former Iraqi Army 
soldier, and nearly one hundred of his comrades, demonstrated 
at the North Gate entrance to the Green Zone in Baghdad, pro-
testing the dissolution of the Iraqi Army. U.S. soldiers blocked 
the crowd’s ingress to the Green Zone. Protestors threw rocks, 
but the U.S. soldiers made no violent gestures because the rocks 
posed no imminent danger. A Military Police convoy of three 
HMMWVs (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or 
Humvee) slowly moved through the crowd. The soldier man-
ning the high-powered machine gun in the last HMMWV fired 
two shots into the crowd. One bullet hit Mr. Mohammed. The 
soldier later claimed he returned fire in the direction where 
shots emanated. An investigation later concluded that it was 
more probable that gunshots were not fired from the crowd. Mr. 
Mohammed later died from his wound. The United States paid 
his widow $2,500 for her loss.
Mr. Abbas was driving in his white van on June 29, 2003 on 
Haifa Street in Baghdad. As he passed through the Hamm ad 
Shihab traffic circle, a rocket-propelled grenade was fired from 
a green BMW at nearby U.S. soldiers. None of the soldiers were 
injured, and they quickly returned fire. The green BMW sped 
away. Two bullets errantly hit Mr. Abbas. He died at a hospital 
several days later from his wounds. The United States paid his 
widow $2,500 for her loss.
In early 2004 the survivors in each of these cases filed com-
pensation claims with the author of this article at the Baghdad 
Convention Center. The U.S. military responded by issuing 
judgments in the form of “condolence payments.” 
U.S. military and civilian leadership take tremendous pride 
in the accuracy of their weaponry and the exceptional training of 
their military personnel. Nevertheless, innocent casualties are an 
unfortunate reality of warfare. While the practice of firebombing 
cities seems behind us, on two occasions U.S. forces lead exten-
sive attacks that combined artillery fire, air strikes, and ground 
attacks on Falluja, a town west of Baghdad with a population of 
300,000. Civilian casualties mount daily in Iraq even without 
“major battles.” Despite the mounting death toll, no mechanism 
legally obligates the United States (or any military power) to 
compensate victims of lawful armed conflict. In Iraq, the United 
States sometimes provides nominal amounts of compensation to 
victims’ families, but this article argues that offering full com-
pensation is imperative. 
Most discussions about armed conflict treat civilian casual-
ties as a tragic but unavoidable result that should be minimized 
to the extent possible. This discussion must be expanded. In 
wars of choice or intervention, military powers must be legally 
obligated to compensate victims’ families in an adequate, 
timely, and just manner. 
reSponSiBility to CoMpenSate
Today no norm or obligation exists within international 
human rights or international humanitarian law requiring a gov-
ernment to compensate foreign nationals innocently harmed. 
However, an emerging norm requiring compensation or repa-
ration exists if the harm results from a war crime or crime 
against humanity.2 In this vein, the U.S. military can make 
compensation payments under the Foreign Claims Act3 (FCA) 
when U.S. soldiers unlawfully harm innocent civilians. The 
Devising a new system for compensating innocent Iraqi civilian casu-
alties is imperative.
* Jonathan Tracy is an LL.M. candidate at American University, 
Washington College of Law. He served as a Judge Advocate in the 
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sultant for the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict.
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FCA creates a system intended to provide full monetary com-
pensation to victims of unlawful acts — such as the incident in 
Mahmudiyah where four U.S. soldiers raped a young girl and 
murdered her and her family.4 Unfortunately, the military has 
grossly underutilized the FCA and has not used the statute in 
many of the most egregious murder and assault cases in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, including the incident in Mahmudiyah. The 
FCA allows civil society to articulate concerns when the United 
States fails to compensate victims of unlawful acts. However, 
there are no laws requiring the military to compensate civilians 
harmed during lawful military operations. 
The term “civilian” is defined here as a person not armed, 
formally associated with the groups in conflict, or taking direct 
part in the conflict. In Iraq, it is impossible to determine the 
number of civilian casualties harmed by U.S. personnel versus 
those harmed by various insurgent groups. Certainly, U.S. com-
bat-related actions have harmed thousands of civilians, whether 
through targeted air strikes, civilians caught in the crossfire, 
or civilians killed through the escalation of force when U.S. 
soldiers misperceive a threat. This situation results in moral and 
practical imperatives necessitating compensation. 
When a nation chooses to enter war, whether justifying it 
under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect or some other 
authority, it takes on the responsibility to fight a “just war.” 
While many just war discussions focus on jus ad bellum — the 
justness of entering a war — and jus en bello — fighting a war in 
a just manner — few emphasize jus post bellum — justice after 
war. When ethicists discuss jus post bellum, they are concerned 
with the rightness of the conclusion of war. A just conclusion 
exists when: (1) a more secure and just state of affairs than 
existed prior to the war is established; and (2) the protection of 
an individual’s human rights is more secure.5 Practitioners and 
scholars concerned with jus post bellum are mainly concerned 
with reparation, trials for war crimes and crimes against human-
ity and reconstruction efforts to rebuild infrastructure and the rule 
of law.6 The right of innocently harmed civilians to compensa-
tion must be added. Civilians’ rights remain insecure if no legal 
mechanism exists for them to receive compensation. Instead of 
increasing security, war has destroyed their lives, killed their 
loved ones, and diminished their prospects for a stable future. 
There is no justice if “armies of right” bulldoze over civilians 
and leave them to decay in the mire of war’s aftermath. Offering 
surviving family members payment recognizes victims’ dignity 
and helps alleviate families’ immediate needs. 
Along with moral reasons, practical considerations 
also play a key role. The new U.S. Army Field Manual on 
Counterinsurgency greatly stresses the importance of winning 
civilians’ hearts and minds.7 To win hearts and minds, militaries 
must take a holistic approach to rebuilding a nation after war 
by providing infrastructure, governance, safety and well-being. 
Failure in these components may prevent lasting victory. When 
people lose faith in the occupying army or a new government, 
they may seek insurgent forces for shelter or assistance. If 
militaries abuse the civilian population, whether by cordoning 
off entire blocks and arresting all fighting aged men, destroy-
ing property while raiding houses, frightening children during 
searches, embarrassing honor-bound men, or unintentionally 
killing and harming civilians, they will send the population into 
the enemy’s waiting arms. Thus, positive treatment of civil-
ians becomes imperative to strategic military interests. While 
building a school or hospital may help the military “win over” a 
community, providing individual monetary assistance to a fam-
ily who lost a breadwinner during a firefight can “win over” a 
family and a neighborhood. 
These moral and practical considerations necessitate that 
governments and policy-makers ensure militaries can provide 
full compensation to innocent civilians harmed as a result of 
armed conflict. The normative legal framework of humanitarian 
law should include equitable and adequate combat claims. 
the inaDeQuaCy oF ConDolenCe payMentS in iraQ
Although U.S. law does not formally recognize a right to file 
combat claims, U.S. military attorneys and commanders have 
stated that paying combat claims is essential to the military’s 
interests in repeated engagements since the Vietnam War. After 
an incident involving the deaths of many Vietnamese in the city 
of Nha Trang, Judge Advocates at U.S. military headquarters in 
Vietnam convinced ground commanders that paying claimants 
would “gain the goodwill of the people,”8 and that an “effective 
claims program supported the war against the guerrillas.”9 While 
the military used contingency funds in this particular case, Judge 
Advocates recommended that U.S. law be amended to authorize 
combat related claims.10 Military lawyers continue to realize that 
offering combat claims is important. In its after-action review 
of the first year of combat missions after September 11, 2001, 
the U.S. Army’s Center for Law and Military Operations wrote, 
“[C]ommanders believed that the payment of legitimate claims 
helped win the hearts and minds of the populace and enhanced 
their units’ force protection postures.”11 
Instead of creating an equitable law, in every major conflict 
since Vietnam, the United States has implemented ad hoc nomi-
nal payment programs. Iraq is no different. The only form of 
combat claims that U.S. military regulations allow are termed 
solatia payments. These are nominal amounts payable from a 
commander’s operation and maintenance funds as an expression 
of sympathy. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) — the com-
mand responsible for Iraq and Afghanistan — did not authorize 
“An equitable combat 
claims system helps ensure 
that victims will not only 
view the alien army as the 
harbinger of pain and suf-
fering, but as a force that 
fairly and justly compen-
sates those they harm.”
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solatia payments at the start of operation Iraqi Freedom, reason-
ing that issuing solatia payments contravened local customs. The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently issued 
a report citing some Marine units that briefly used solatia in Iraq, 
however.12 Without solatia, the military lacked mechanisms to 
provide monetary assistance to innocent civilians harmed from 
March 19, 2003 until the following September when the military 
established the current ad hoc program. The highest level of 
command in Iraq authorized “condolence payments” to be dis-
persed from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program 
(CERP) fund. Commanders may use CERP funds to assist the 
Iraqi people by providing “condolence payments to Iraqi civil-
ians for the death or injury resulting from U.S., coalition, and 
supporting military operations.” For several reasons the program 
is inequitable and inadequately meets the moral and practical 
goals of a combat claims program.
First, payments for every death, injury, or property dam-
age incident are limited to $2,500. Brigadier generals or higher 
can now authorize payments of up to $10,000; however, there 
is little to no evidence of any individual payments exceeding 
$2,500 per death. Placing a price on personal tragedy is always 
difficult, but it is possible to provide payments respectfully and 
in line with regional customs. Under the FCA, officers may 
pay full market value when a tank runs over an Iraqi’s truck in 
the course of a non-combat related accident, but may only pay 
$2,500 for the death of a civilian killed in a firefight. A $2,500 
payment provides little help to widows, like Mr. Mohammed’s 
wife, with several young mouths to feed. This artificial limit 
leaves survivors bitter and frustrated with the United States.
Second, reconstruction projects overshadow condolence pay-
ments. Commanders prioritize CERP funds for reconstruction 
projects at hospitals, schools, or power stations, at the expense 
of condolence payments. In fiscal year 2005 condolence pay-
ments accounted for eight percent of all CERP disbursements; 
in fiscal year 2006 it decreased to five percent. The perception 
in this author’s unit was that fixing a school and employing Iraqi 
contractors allowed funds to go further than paying a widow 
for losing her husband. And when the same fund supports both 
projects, the one of lesser importance gets short-changed. Mr. 
Mahmoud did not receive compensation after his daughter died 
from a cluster munition because funds for condolence payments 
were unavailable when he visited the convention center.
Third, the rules governing condolence payments are ad hoc. 
Each unit takes different approaches to if, when, and how to 
make condolence payments. Some units choose to pay only high 
profile cases. Others will not pay claims when a different unit 
caused the harm no matter how difficult or impossible it will 
be for an Iraqi to file with the “appropriate” unit. In Ramadi 
military officials told local Iraqis that they could not file claims 
when the incident occurred over three months before.13 This 
does not afford the victim or survivor time to collect evidence 
or documents; nor does it allow for time to grieve before fil-
ing a claim. A final problem resulting from the program’s ad 
hoc nature is that no adequate claims officers’ guidelines exist. 
Different victims receive disparate treatment because officers 
lack substantive guidance regarding standard of proof, rules of 
evidence, how to determine valuation, or sensitivity training. 
Unit lawyers will not operate effectively or uniformly without 
concrete guidance. The nature of this system leads to drastically 
different results for civilians who suffer the same harm. These 
conflicting outcomes intensify negativity and nullify any poten-
tial goodwill won by offering condolence payments.
The sum of these problems creates a program where hearts 
and minds are not won and victims are not offered redress. 
With firsthand experience meeting over 1,000 Iraqis, this author 
knows well that the current system is not meeting its goals.
reCoMMenDationS For an  
eQuitaBle CoMpenSation SySteM 
For a combat claims system to work effectively, the U.S. 
Congress should legislate a fair, just and equitable system to 
compensate innocent civilian survivors and victims’ family 
members. This program should possess several characteristics. 
First, it is essential that the program be permanent and stand-
alone. As long as the military creates ad hoc programs for each 
military engagement, combat claims will generally fall under 
a larger umbrella of reconstruction projects where the use of 
claims will be minimal and overshadowed. With a separate sys-
tem, funds will always be accessible when needed. Timeliness 
is essential because a family’s suffering generally grows expo-
nentially when help is delayed. Also, an institutional program 
will allow the military to start the program soon after combat 
commences — within days or weeks instead of six months. 
Permanence would also eliminate disparate results.
Widows of Iraqi civilians accidentally killed during the current conflict 


















Tracy: Responsibility to Pay: Compensating Civilian Casualties of War
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007
19
Second, military officers should make claims payments. 
Allowing State Department officials or a non-governmental 
organization to make payments, while attractive for other 
reasons, does not achieve one of the program’s major goals. 
Because the military engages in combat activity and causes 
innocent civilian casualties, the military should offer vic-
tims’ families condolence for its actions through payments. 
Furthermore, recognizing harm done can be as important as the 
monetary payment. The recognition a family receives will mean 
more coming from someone wearing the same uniform as the 
person who harmed the loved one. Keeping the program within 
the military also serves the purpose of documenting civilian 
casualties. Without knowing an accurate number of civilian 
casualties, it is difficult to evaluate claims that the United States 
minimizes civilian casualties as much as possible.14 
Third, the U.S. military must lift the $2,500 payment limit. 
The program must contain a mechanism to allow larger pay-
ments in deserving cases. Similarly, the amount must be high 
enough to demonstrate genuine condolence and provide enough 
resources for the survivors to recover from the loss in the short-
term. 
Fourth, a claimant must be able to appeal the initial deci-
sion when he feels the amount offered is inadequate. Similarly, 
if the claim is denied outright, the claimant must be given an 
opportunity to file additional materials and appeal the decision 
to a higher authority. The claimant deserves to know the basis 
for decisions and to have decisions in writing. Transparency is 
1 The facts and circumstances of each case discussed in this article 
are true and accurate, but the names have been altered. The author 
possesses copies of each case file. 
2 See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 
(Dec. 16, 2005); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
art. 75, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
3 Statute of the United States Code, 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a)(3) (2007). 
4 Claims are compensable under the FCA only if “[they] did not 
arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly from 
an act of the armed forces of the United States in combat . . . indi-
rectly related to combat, and occurring while preparing for, going 
to, or returning from a combat mission.” 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(3). 
Therefore, any injury, death, or property damage caused during 
lawful combat action may not be paid under the FCA. 
5 brian orend, the morality oF War 163 (1st ed. 2006).
6 Richard DiMeglio, The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: 
Defining Jus Post Bellum, 186 mil. l. rev. 116, 154 (2005).
7 u.s. army, army Field manual 3-24 counterinsurgency (Dec. 
2006), available at http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2007)
8 Frederic borch, Judge advocates in vietnam: army laWyers in 
southeast asia 1959–1975 41, (1st ed. 2003). 
9 Id. at 40.
10 Id. at 41.
11 Center for Law and Military Operations, The Judge Advocate 
General’s Legal Center and School, Legal Lessons Learned from 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Volume I: Major Combat Operations 11 
September 2001-1 May 2003 175, available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/doddir/army/clamo-v1.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
12 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), The 
Department of Defense’s Use of Solatia and Condolence Payments 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d07699.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
13 A copy of the bulletin dispersed to Iraqis visiting the Ramadi 
claims site in 2005 is in the author’s files. 
14 The GAO’s report and the documents released thus far under 
the American Civil Liberties Union’s Freedom of Information Act 
request have brought us no closer to knowing the true number.
essential in this process so that civilians understand and respect 
the program. 
Fifth, for the program to be successful, claims officers must 
be adequately trained. The U.S. Army trains Judge Advocates in 
operational law, a discipline under which claims training could 
fall. Operational law training allows lawyers to provide excel-
lent legal advice in the field. Adding combat claims training will 
allow the program to run efficiently and uniformly. The training 
must provide practical guidance on applicable standards of proof 
and other evidentiary issues, as well as provide education on 
why the program is important and why and how claims officers 
must show empathy towards victims. Establishing guidelines 
for this program is difficult because valuation will always be 
somewhat subjective; however, it is possible to effectively train 
lawyers to evaluate each case by its facts and circumstances to 
find an appropriate amount.
ConCluSion
War need not be totally unForgiving. When innocent peo-
ple become intertwined in the consequences of armed conflict, 
a chance for recognition and compassion exists. An equitable 
combat claims system helps ensure that victims will not only 
view the alien army as the harbinger of pain and suffering, but 
as a force that fairly and justly compensates those they harm. 
International humanitarian law principles and norms should be 
expanded to recognize that innocent civilians deserve assistance 
in order to more fully possess their rights.                        HRB
EnDnotEs: reSponSiBility to pay
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